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Abstract
 　This article shows the resource allocation effects of export performance requirements (EPRs) 
on the foreign multi-national firm and the welfare in the host country when the market in the 
host country is under duopoly. To verify how EPRs affect the foreign multi-national firm, we find 
that difference in the marginal cost between the foreign and the host country is crucial in the 
without-EPRs equilibrium. With respect to the host country’s welfare, we derive a necessary 
condition for the host country to improve its welfare by imposing EPRs at the without-EPRs 
equilibrium. Moreover, if outputs are strategic complements, the multi-national firm might be 
better-off, while the host country necessarily loses.
Keywords: Export performance requirements; oligopoly; Trade policy
Trade-related investment measures
JEL Classification Numbers: F12, F13
1　Introduction
In the last decades, the foreign direct investment has significantly emerged throughout the world. 
Some of the host countries, however, imposed numerous restrictions on it to protect domestic 
industries.  Some of these investment measures violate the National Treatment Agreement (Article 
III of GATT 1994) or the agreements on the quantitative restrictions (Article XI of GATT 1994). 
Therefore, they are prohibited by the Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures (TRIMs 
Agreement hereafter), which contains statements prohibiting any TRIMs that are inconsistent with 
the provisions of the GATT Articles.  An example of these restrictions on foreign direct investment 
is the export performance requirements, which violate the Article XI of GATT.  Export performance 
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requirements require that a specified percentage of total production volume of foreign subsidiary be 
exported1）.
　 There is few literature that directly analyzes export performance requirements, despite a large 
literature on the local content requirements, which are also restrictions on foreign direct investment 
and require that certain components be domestically manufactured.  A seminal work on the export 
performance requirements is Rodrik (1987) which develops the general equilibrium model of export 
performance requirements, and investigates the resource allocation effects and welfare effects of 
the restrictions.  Davidson et al. (1987) also provides the partial equilibrium analysis of performance 
standards for foreign direct investment including local content protection and export performance 
requirements under two country oligopoly model.
　 This paper investigates export performance requirements in the three country model when markets 
are imperfectly competitive.  The purpose of this paper is twofold.  The first purpose is to verify 
whether export performance requirements are protecting measures, and to clarify on what conditions 
it depends.  We also argue the effectiveness of export performance requirements.  The second 
purpose is to investigate an welfare implication of introducing export performance requirements.  With 
respect to these aims, Rodrik (1987) and Davidson et al. (1987) show that, in a certain case, export 
performance requirements decrease the total profits of foreign multi-national, and increase the host 
country’s welfare.
　 These results in the literature, however, critically depend on the following two assumptions.  First, 
in those models, the marginal cost in foreign country is always assumed to be lower than that in the 
host country.  There is no reason why they have to exclude the case where the foreign marginal cost 
is higher than that of subsidiary.  Empirically speaking, the cost difference between host country and 
source country is one of the major sources for foreign direct investment as well as well-known tariff-
jumping motive.  Thus, the case that is omitted in a literature might be more realistic.  Second, they 
specifically assume that outputs are strategic substitutes.  In recent years, the analyses on the strategic 
trade policies have focused on the case of strategic complements as well as strategic substitutes.
　 Contrary to those models, we consider possible situations where the marginal cost in foreign 
country can be lower or higher than that in host country, and outputs can be strategic substitutes or 
complements.  We focus not only an equilibrium under export performance requirements but also an 
equilibrium without EPRs as a benchmark.  We show that the cost difference between foreign and host 
country is crucial in the without-EPRs equilibrium.  However, we also show that the cost difference 
is no longer needed to deliver conditions for when the host country’s welfare gets better-off, and for 
when the foreign multi-nationals gets worse-off, and so on.  Strategic substitutes among goods is 
1）　For the other examples of TRIMs and the relations between TRIMs Agreement and the GATT/WTO system, 
see Greenaway (1991) and Mutti (1994).
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necessary for welfare improving of host country.  It should be noted that strategic relations among 
goods plays more important role than the cost difference for welfare improvement.
　 The rest of the paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 provides the basic model without any 
restrictions on exports.  We characterize the without EPRs equilibrium in this section as a benchmark. 
We introduce export performance requirements by the host country, and examine the effects of the 
protection for both cases where marginal cost of producing in foreign country is higher and lower than 
that in host country in section 3.  Section 4 provides concluding remarks.
2　Basic model without EPRs
We consider three country model including source country S, host country H and rest of the world W. 
There is a multi-national firm (parent firm A) in country S which has a subsidiary (firm B) in country 
H to supply homogeneous goods to country H and rest of the world.  The foreign subsidiary competes 
in quantities against a domestic local firm (firm d) in the host country with a Cournot conjecture.  We 
treat foreign direct investment as exogenously given, and we do not consider the parent firm’s choice 
between exporting and direct investment for supplying goods to country H.  Multi-national firm can 
supply goods to the rest of world from the parent firm or the subsidiary with no transportation cost. 
We denote the total amount of multi-national firm’s total supply to the rest of world by X*≡XA＋XB, 
where XA and XB are supply from parent and subsidiary  to the rest of world, respectively.  The demand 
in the rest of world is given by the following inverse-demand function:
Pw＝ Pw(X*),  P w'(X*)<0, (1)
where Pw is the consumer price in the rest of the world.  The inverse-demand function in the country 
H is given by
PH＝PH (xh),  PH'(xh)<0, (2)
where PH and x
h≡xb＋xd are the consumer price and total demand in the country H, respectively.  xi 
(i＝b, d) are firm i’s output.  The inverse-demand functions are assumed to be twice continuously 
differentiable.
　 Production technologies of firms are assumed to vary according to the location of production. 
Technologies are characterized by constant marginal costs cj ( j＝H, S); cS for the parent, and cH for the 
subsidiary and the domestic local firm.  Total profit of foreign multi-national firm is given by
П*(XA, XB, xb, xd)＝Pw(X*) X*－XAcS＋PH (xh) xb－(xb＋XB) cH. (3)
Thus, the profit of foreign multi-national firm consists of total revenue minus total costs.  The profit of 
domestic local firm in the host country is given by
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πd(xd, xb)＝PH(xh) xd－ cH xd. (4)
We assume that the profit functions are strictly concave in quantities for fixed other quantities.  The 
first-order conditions under Cournot conjectures are
∂П*
∂XA＝P
w'・(XA＋XB)＋Pw－cS＝0,  (5)
∂П*
∂xb ＝P
h'xb＋PH－cH＝0, (6)
∂П*
∂XB＝P
w'・(XA＋XB)＋Pw－cH＝0,  (7)
∂πd
∂xd ＝P
h'xd＋PH－cH＝0. (8)
We have five variables: X*, XA, XB, xb and xd, and four equations.  Noting that X*＝XA＋XB, four 
independent variables exist in this economy.  From (6) and (8), we can obtain the reaction functions 
of xi＝xi(xj) where i＝d, f and i≠j.  From (5) and (7), we can arrange the first-order conditions with 
respect to XA and XB as follows:
XA(XB)＝ Pw－cS－Pw' －X
B,  XB(XA)＝ Pw－cH－Pw' －X
A,
where Pw'≡(∂Pw /∂X*).  If the production technology of foreign (resp. host) country is superior to 
that of host (resp. foreign) country, the outputs at the equilibrium are XA＝X* and XB＝0 (resp. XB＝X* 
and XA＝0).  We define the export ratio of the subsidiary by α＿≡[XB/(xb＋XB)].  It should be noted that 
in the case of cS<cH, where the firm p has more efficient technology than the firm s, α＿＝0, while α＿
＝ [X*/xb(xd)＋X*]<1 in the case of cS>cH, where the firm s has more efficient technology.  Thus, the 
following lemma is strait-forward:
Lemma 1. If the parent (resp. subsidiary) firm has more efficient technology and lower marginal cost, 
then the subsidiary (resp. parent) firm does not supply good to the rest of world, which implies that α＿＝0 
(resp. 0<α＿<1).
α＿＝0
0<α＿<1　holds when　
cS<cH
cS>cH
　respectively.
　 Lemma 1 intuitively states that the more efficient firm should supply the good to the rest of world 
market as possible.
3　Export performance requirements
In the previous section, we proposed the relations between α＿ and cost differences under the 
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equilibrium without EPRs.  In this section, we introduce export performance requirements by host 
country on foreign subsidiary which require that a certain percentage of total production volume 
of foreign subsidiary must be exported.  We define the percentage of exports accounting for total 
production of foreign subsidiary as
α X
B
xb＋XB ,  such that　α∈ (0, 1).
We exclude the case of α<α＿ because if government imposes export performance requirements 
below α＿, this requirement is over-bound and has no restrictive effects on the supply of the subsidiary 
to the market in the host country.  We also exclude the case of α＿＝1, where xb is zero under without-
EPRs equilibrium.  We focus on the equilibrium where the requirement is relatively more restrictive 
than that under without-EPRs equilibrium.  Thus, we assume that the requirement is just binding in 
equilibrium.
　 The objective of the host country’s government is to improve its welfare by introducing export 
performance requirements under without-EPRs equilibrium.  Thus, the conditions in our results do 
not have to hold globally.  We suppose that they hold at least in the neighborhood of the without-EPRs 
equilibrium.  The welfare measure we adopt is the standard total surplus function.  Thus, welfare of 
country H consists of consumers’ surplus and profits of the domestic local firm:
Wh(xd, xb)＝CSh＋πd(xd, xb). (9)
The profits of multi-national firm under EPRs is given by:
П*(XA, xb ;α )＝Pw(X*)X*－XAcS＋P(xh)xb－(XB＋xb) cH
where
X*＝XA＋XB， (10a)
XB
α
(1－α) x
b． (10b)
Although there are four foreign variables X*, XA, XB and xb, we are sure from (10a) and (10b) that 
there exists only two variables (Xp and xb, for example) which are independent among them.  The 
determination of xb leads to XB through the binding export performance requirements.  X* is derived 
by XA and XB.  The first-order conditions for the foreign multi-national firm are given by partially 
differentiating П* with respect to XA and xb:
∂П*
∂XA＝P 'w X*＋ (Pw－cS) 0,  with equality if　X
A>0, (11)
∂П*
∂xb ＝ (
α
1－α )(P'w X*＋Pw－cH)＋(P'H xb＋PH－cH)＝0. (12)
We first suppose that XA>0.  Then, (11) is satisfied with equality, which implies that the determination 
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of X* is independent from α.  Using (11) with equality, we can rearrange (12) as
P 'H x
b＋PH－ cH－αcS1－α ＝0.
It should be noted that “the effective marginal cost” for the subsidiary’s supply in the host country’s 
market is as follows:
θ≡ cH－αcS
1－α ＝ cS＋
cH－cS
1－α . (13)
It is obvious from (13) that whether θ is increasing in α depends on the sign of (cH－cS).  To verify 
this, we must know that when XA takes positive values.  When cS<cH, it is intuitive to consider that X
A 
is positive, because we already know that, at the without-EPRs equilibrium, XA＝X* and α＿＝0.  If the 
country H imposes α slightly higher than α＿＝0, then it is unlikely that XA becomes zero as long as 
the market size of the rest of the world is not so small.  When cS>cH on the other, we can show that X
A
＝0 in the EPRs equilibrium with following steps.  Suppose XA>0 holds with cS>cH.  Then, from (13), 
θ'(α)<0 and (dxb / dα)>0.  Recalling that XA＝X*(cS)－XB,
dXA
dα ＝－(
dXB
dα )＝－
xb
(1－α)2 －(
α
1－α )(
dxb
dα )<0.
We should note that, when we evaluate (dXA / dα) at the neighborhood of without-EPRs equilibrium, 
(dXA / dα)|α＝α<0 implies that XA takes a negative value, which contradicts XA>0.
　 Thus, we immediately obtain following lemma with respect to XA.
Lemma 2. Suppose country H imposes export performance requirements such as α>α＿ and α is just 
binding.  Then XA 0  if  cS<cH  and X
A＝0  if  cS>cH.
　 From Lemma 2, when the marginal cost of parent firm is lower than that of subsidiary, we can 
confirm from (13) that an increase in α from the without-EPRs equilibrium level causes the effective 
marginal cost for the subsidiary θ higher.  Thus, foreign subsidiary decreases supply for the host 
country’s market xb if  cS is less than cH.  To determine the effects of an increase of export performance 
requirements on the profit of multi-national firm in this case, we differentiate П* with respect to α 
and obtain
dП*
dα ＝P'H x
b dxd
dxb
 
dxb
dα －
cH－cS
(1－α)2・x
b. (14)
The first term in (14) indicates the effects of an increasing in α through the strategic interaction 
between xb and xd.  We should note that (dxd / dxb)<0 (resp. (dxd / dxb)>0) holds if outputs are strategic 
substitutes (SS hereafter) (resp. complements, SC).  The second term shows the loss from relatively 
inefficient production.  Thus, when cS<cH, the total profit of the multi-national firm decreases if outputs 
are strategic substitutes, but might increases only if outputs are strategic complements.
　 When the marginal cost of parent firm is higher than that of subsidiary, XA＝0 implies that (11) does 
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not hold with equality.  Noting that X*＝XB when cS>cH, we arrange (12) as follows:
[( α1－α ){(
α
1－α )P'w xb＋Pw－cH}]＋ [P'H xb＋PH－cH]＝0, (15)
where we assume xb>0.  First bracket in (15) shows that the marginal profitability in the rest of world 
market, and the second bracket shows that the marginal profitability in the host country market.  To 
clarify the effect of increasing α on the xb, we provide following two examples.  First, if we assume 
that the multi-national firm does not change xb, then XB must be raised at the EPRs equilibrium. 
The profits in the rest of world market falls, however the profits in the market of country H remains 
constant.  Thus, the multi-national firm never gains at the EPRs equilibrium as far as xb remains 
constant.
　 Second, we assume that the multi-national firm does not alter exports XB, then xb must be decreased 
at the EPRs equilibrium.  The profits in the market of country H rises or falls depending on the 
strategic substitutability, however the profits in the rest of world market remains constant.  The effects 
of change in xb on the profits in the country H is:
dП*H
dxb
＝P 'H xb( dx
d
dxb ).
Thus, П*H rises (resp. falls) with a decrease in xb when the output in the country H is strategic 
complements (resp. substitutes).  In the case of the strategic complements, the multi-national firm can 
gain from EPRs.
　 Next, we consider the case where the multi-national firm changes both xb and XB.  Using the implicit 
function theorem, equation (15) leads to a change in xd with respect to α.
dxd
dα ＝－
（∂2П*/∂α∂xb）
（∂2П*/∂xb2）
Second-order condition implies that (dxb / dα)<0.  Thus, foreign subsidiary decreases supply for the 
host country’s market regardless of cost differences between cS and cH.  To determine the effects of 
an increase in α on the total profit of multi-national firm, we differentiate П* with respect to α and 
obtain
dП*
dα ＝P'H x
b dxd
dxb
 
dxb
dα －
cH
(1－α)2・x
b. (16)
The effect of α on profits in equation (16) seems similar to (14) with a slight difference in the second 
term.
　 Thus, we obtain following lemmas with respect to xb and the profits of the multi-national firm П*.
Lemma 3. Suppose country H imposes EPRs such as α>α＿ and α is just binding.  Then the supply of 
the subsidiary to the host country xb always falls regardless of cost difference.  The total profit of the multi-
national firm always falls if outputs in the local market are strategic substitutes, but might rise when 
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outputs are strategic complements.
　 Next, we show some comparative statics.  The effects of a change in α on outputs are given by
dXB
dα ＝
1
(1－α)2  x
b＋ α
1－α・
dxb
dα ， (17)
dxd
dα ＝ (
dxd
dxb )・(
dxb
dα )， (18)
d(xb＋xd)
dα ＝ (1＋
dxd
dxb )・(
dxb
dα )． (19)
From (17) and Lemma 3, in the case of cS<cH, we evaluate (dX
B/dα) at α＝0 and obtain (dXB /dα)>0. 
In the case of cS<cH, however, the sign of (dX
B/dα) is generally ambiguous.  Noting that α takes 
0<α<1 and that (1/(1－α)2) becomes greater with larger α, (dXB/dα)|α>0 likely to be positive.  Thus, 
following lemma is obvious with respect to XB.
Lemma 4. Suppose country H imposes export performance requirement such as α>α＿ and α is just 
binding. Then exports from foreign subsidiary to the rest of world XB unambiguously increases.
　 From (18), the effect of α on xd depends on the strategic substitutability between xd and xb.  From (18) 
and Lemma 3, we obtain following lemma with respect to xd.
Lemma 5. Suppose country H imposes export performance requirement such as α>α＿ andα is just 
binding.  Then output of the domestic local firm xd increases (resp. decreases) if and only if outputs in the 
local market are strategic substitutes (resp. complements).
　 From(19), it should be noted that a change in aggregate supply in the host country’s market xh＝xb
＋xd has one-to-one relation with a change in price PH.  Noting that－1< (dxd/dxb) <1 holds, we obtain 
following lemma on the effect of αon price PH.
Lemma 6. Suppose country H imposes export performance requirements such as α>α＿ and α is just 
binding.  Then the price in the host country PH always rises regardless of strategic relationship and cost 
difference.
　 Finally, we investigate the effect on welfare of a change in the rate of export performance 
requirements.  We totally differentiate (9) with respect to α and evaluate it at the without EPRs 
equilibrium level α＿.
dWh
dα  α＝α＿＝－x
b( dPHdα )＋(PH－cH)(
dxd
dα )．
(dW h / dα) /α＝α＿>0 implies that a small increase inαraises the host country’s welfare.
　 Combining Lemma 5 and 6, the analysis in this section leads to the following proposition.
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Proposition 1. Suppose country H imposes export performance requirements such as α>α＿ and α is 
just binding.  Then following statements on the profit and welfare are derived.
(i) The foreign subsidiary always decreases supply for the domestic local market regardless of cost 
differences among countries.
(ii) When outputs in the host country’s market are strategic substitutes, the change in the host country’s 
welfare is ambiguous, while the domestic local firm always gets better-off and the foreign multi-national 
firm always loses. 
(iii) When outputs are strategic complements, the profit of the multi-national firm might increase, while the 
host country always suffers from EPRs.
　 We should note that the host country’s welfare increases by EPRs only if outputs are strategic 
substitutes.  It should be also noted that when outputs are strategic complements, the host country’s 
government cannot raise its welfare by introducing export performance requirements.
4　Concluding Remarks
In a three-country model, we have shown how export performance requirements affect the profit 
of multi-national firm and the host country’s welfare when the market in the host country is under 
duopoly.  We draw two main conclusions from this analysis.
　 First, we have examined that whether and when the export performance requirements protect 
domestic local firm.  Introducing export performance requirements at the without-EPRs equilibrium 
always decreases the market share of the foreign subsidiary. Thus, whether the export performance 
requirements are protecting measures depends not on the cost difference among countries but also on 
the strategic substitutabilities.
　 Second, we have investigated the welfare implication of introducing export performance 
requirements at the without-EPRs equilibrium.  In general, the effect of export performance 
requirements on the host country’s welfare depends not on cost difference among countries but also 
on the strategic substitutability of goods.  We found what condition is required for welfare to improve 
by imposing export performance requirements.  Strategic substitutes among goods are necessary for 
welfare improvement of host country.  On the other hand, when outputs are strategic complements, 
host country cannot raise its welfare by imposing EPRs.
　 Moreover, we have obtained some interesting results in certain cases.  When outputs are strategic 
complements, introducing export performance requirements might raise the profits of multi-national 
firm, while the host country’s welfare necessarily falls.
　 As a final remark, we emphasize that this paper in no way to support the strait-from-the-shoulder 
use of export performance requirements.  There is no possibility for the case where both multi-national 
firm and the host country’s welfare gain from introducing export performance requirements.  All of 
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results in lemmas and proposition do not require the condition on cost difference among countries, 
whereas we need the condition on the strategic relationaship among goods.
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